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ABSTRACT 
 
The process of liberalization is shaping the policies of governments regarding the key sectors 
such as energy. Turkey has also gone through these processes and the current downstream 
petroleum market is considered to be liberal with one private refinery and many players in 
petroleum products retail market. In this paper, pricing mechanisms and market structure in 
the Turkish downstream petroleum industry will be investigated in detail focusing on the 
period between 2007 and 2009. In order to conduct such analysis, market efficiency will be 
analyzed in detail by applying econometric tools to test for asymmetric price patterns if there 
exists between crude oil prices and fuel prices in Turkey. The aim of this paper is to draw a 
general picture of the current market as well as looking at the market developments and 
analyzing the pricing mechanisms in the sector via taking into account the margins and 
pricing behaviors of players by applying different methodologies combining with comparative 
analysis. 
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PREFACE 
 
This thesis is written within the Master of Science in Economics and Business 
Administration. 
In an effort to contribute to the research community in resource economics and bring attention 
to the pricing asymmetries and market inefficiencies, we have investigated the Turkish 
downstream petroleum industry in an attempt to analyze the market structure and test its 
efficiency through analysis of asymmetrical pricing transformations from upstream to 
downstream petroleum markets. To complement this analysis, an empirical study was 
conducted using weekly price data of Brent crude oil prices and pump prices of fuel in Turkey 
during a three-year-period. The empirical tests are considered statistically strong thanks to the 
sufficient amount of data. 
The unique characteristics of the petroleum industry as a vertically integrated sector with 
price transmissions on different levels and monopoly position of the refiner in the Turkish 
downstream petroleum industry have motivated us to study these features and their impact on 
the market efficiency; a subject of interest to the different stakeholders in the petroleum 
industry. 
We here acknowledge our much felted gratitude and thanks to our supervisor, Røgnvaldur 
Hannesson, for the valuable comments and guidance. Besides, we would like to thank 
Norwegian School of Economics to open research areas for the researchers interested in 
energy, resource and environmental economics through ENE master program. 
We would like also to address our thanks to our family and friends for their support. 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT .............................................................................................................................. 2 
PREFACE ................................................................................................................................. 3 
LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................. 7 
LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................................... 8 
1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 10 
1.1 Background ................................................................................................................ 10 
1.2 Target and purpose .................................................................................................... 11 
1.3 Research motivation .................................................................................................. 11 
1.4 Research method ........................................................................................................ 13 
1.5 Structure ..................................................................................................................... 13 
2. OVERVIEW OF THE TURKISH PETROLEUM INDUSTRY ................................ 14 
2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 14 
2.2 Oil supply and demand in Turkey ............................................................................. 14 
2.3 Refinery sector ........................................................................................................... 17 
3. MARKET STRUCTURE IN TURKISH DOWNSTREAM PETROLEUM 
MARKET ................................................................................................................................ 20 
3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 20 
3.2 Top five players in the downstream market in terms of sales ................................... 20 
3.3 Market shares of top five players in the downstream market .................................... 22 
5 
 
3.4 Downstream sales figures of different fuel types ...................................................... 23 
4. PRICING ANALYSIS IN THE DOWNSTREAM MARKET ................................... 26 
4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 26 
4.2 Refinery pricing ......................................................................................................... 26 
4.3 Retailer and distributor pricing .................................................................................. 28 
4.4 Taxes .......................................................................................................................... 31 
5. REGULATION IN TURKISH PETROLUEM INDUSTRY ...................................... 35 
5.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 35 
5.2 The Competition Authority ....................................................................................... 36 
5.3 The Energy Market Regulation Authority ................................................................. 37 
6. ECONOMETRIC TOOLS TO TEST THE PRICING ASYMMETRY ................... 39 
6.1 Literature review ........................................................................................................ 40 
6.2 Describing price dynamics ........................................................................................ 42 
6.3 Dynamic OLS method ............................................................................................... 42 
6.4 Stationarity and unit root testing ............................................................................... 43 
6.5 Cointegration analysis ............................................................................................... 44 
6.6 Asymmetric ECM ...................................................................................................... 45 
7. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS .............................................................................................. 47 
7.1 Data ............................................................................................................................ 47 
7.2 Empirical results ............................................................................................................ 50 
7.2.1 Test for stationarity and unit roots ..................................................................... 50 
6 
 
7.2.2 Test for cointegration ......................................................................................... 51 
7.2.3 Modeling asymmetric ECM ............................................................................... 53 
7.2.4 Results ................................................................................................................ 54 
8. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................. 56 
9. REFERENCES ................................................................................................................ 63 
10. APPENDIX .................................................................................................................. 66 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 2.1: Oil production and consumption in Turkey from 1999 – 2009 in million tons. .... 15 
Figure 2.2: Crude oil imports of Turkey in thousand tons from 2007 to 2009. ....................... 16 
Figure 2.3: The share of oil exporting countries in total oil imports of Turkey in 2009. ........ 17 
Figure 2.4: Refinery capacities and crude oil based production figures of Izmit, Izmir, 
Kirikkale and Batman refineries for the years 2007, 2008 and 2009. ...................................... 18 
 
Figure 3.1: Market share development in Turkish downstream petroleum market from 2007 to 
2009. ......................................................................................................................................... 22 
Figure 3.2: Sales of different petroleum products of licensed retailers in Turkey in tons for the 
years 2007, 2008 and 2009. ...................................................................................................... 24 
Figure 3.3: Consumption trends of 95 octane unleaded gasoline and Euro diesel (low sulphur 
diesel) in million m
3
 from 2007 to 2009. ................................................................................. 25 
 
Figure 4.1: Pre-tax refinery prices in Turkey, England and USA in Turkish liras per liter from 
2005 to 2009. ............................................................................................................................ 26 
Figure 4.2: Profit margin figures of Mediterranean average and TUPRAS in dollars per barrel 
from 2005 to 2009. ................................................................................................................... 27 
Figure 4.3: Shares of tax, distributor price, retail whole sale price and refinery price on diesel 
pump prices in Turkey for the first day of 2007, 2008 and 2009. ............................................ 29 
Figure 4.4: Comparison of retailer and distributor pricing together on the pump price of diesel 
without tax in Turkish Liras per liter between Turkey, UK and the US. ................................. 30 
8 
 
Figure 4.5: The value of tax in Euros per liter on final pump prices of fuel in Turkey and EU 
from 2007 to 2009. ................................................................................................................... 31 
Figure 4.6: Contribution of special consumption tax and value added tax to the final pump 
prices of 95 octane unleaded gasoline and diesel in Turkey. ................................................... 32 
 
Figure 7.1: Trend lines of diesel prices with tax, without tax and Brent crude oil prices. ....... 48 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES  
 
Table 2.1: TUPRAS procurement rates of licensed retailers in 2008 and 2009. ..................... 19 
 
Table 4.1: Total government tax revenue and fuel taxes in Turkey in billion Turkish Liras 
from 2007 to 2009. ................................................................................................................... 33 
 
Table 7.1: Descriptive statistics of retail diesel prices in Turkey and Brent crude oil prices. . 49 
Table 7.2: ADF test for weekly diesel prices and Brent crude oil prices. ................................ 51 
Table 7.3: ADF test results for residuals from equation (1). .................................................... 52 
Table 7.4: Estimates of coefficients and test results of asymmetric ECM model. ................... 54 
 
Table 8.1: Results of asymmetry analysis. ............................................................................... 56 
 
9 
 
Table 10.1: Crude oil production in OECD countries from 2002 to 2008, in million tons. .... 66 
Table 10.2: Jarque-Bera normality test results for the variables diesel prices with and without 
tax and crude oil prices. ............................................................................................................ 67 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
 
The Turkish downstream petroleum industry has encountered many structural changes since 
the foundation of republic. The latest radical structural change was privatization of state-
owned refinery TUPRAS and the enactment of new Turkish Petroleum Law to be considered 
as deregulation of the petroleum market. TUPRAS was a state monopoly until 26 January 
2006 and then it was privatized and now it is operated by KOC Company.   
After the privatization of state-owned monopoly TUPRAS, petroleum product prices have 
been determined by market forces. However the monopoly position of TUPRAS has not been 
changed since all the refineries in Turkey are operated by TUPRAS. Moreover market 
structure would be explained as many buyers (retailers) and one supplier (TUPRAS). Thus the 
price mechanisms and market structure are considered to be exceptional in that sense and 
crucial to be researched on, in detail. 
Our interest in the Turkish petroleum industry is particularly in the market efficiency of the 
downstream petroleum market in recent years (2007-2009) in order to examine how 
privatization of the state monopoly TUPRAS has affected the pricing mechanisms and market 
structure. It is interesting to analyze the possible pricing asymmetries in Turkish downstream 
market due to the monopoly position of the refinery. Additionally, there had been an 
increasing public concern regarding high petroleum product prices in Turkey. It is claimed 
that these high prices are a result of asymmetrical price adjustments in the downstream 
petroleum sector. It is highly criticized that downward movements in crude oil prices are not 
transmitted to the petroleum product prices as much and as fast as the upstream movements in 
crude oil prices. Thus it is important to conduct an empirical analysis in order to contribute to 
these discussions and the relevant academic research areas. 
There has been an increasing interest among researchers in analyzing pricing asymmetries 
caused by market inefficiencies, especially in European petroleum markets.  Bacon (1991) 
initiated the asymmetrical price adjustment analysis with his paper on UK gasoline market 
continued with Manning (1991) and Reilly and Witt (1998). Kirchgässner and Kübler (1992) 
analyzed the German market and Contín-Pilart et al. (2008) investigated the Spanish retail 
market of gasoline via testing for possible pricing asymmetries. 
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The main objective of this thesis is to examine and analyze the Turkish downstream 
petroleum market and the efficiency of it via the empirical analysis of possible pricing 
asymmetries in order to examine the factors behind the disturbances of market efficiency. 
 
1.2 Target and purpose 
 
The targeted audience of this paper is mainly researchers and students interested in the market 
structure of the Turkish downstream petroleum industry in terms of pricing mechanisms, 
market efficiencies and comparisons with other countries particularly with the European 
Union. 
The methods and statistical tools in this analysis are mainly used to test for possible 
asymmetries which signal significant responses of Turkish retail fuel prices to increasing 
world crude oil prices, but not to decreases. In order to analyze this market inefficiency, 
econometric modeling involving stationarity and co-integration analysis as well as error 
correction models have been used. 
The results of this empirical analysis could be extended to further research areas and could be 
used by researchers and Turkish retail market participants in order to get an insight of the 
Turkish downstream petroleum industry and its pricing mechanism. 
 
1.3 Research motivation 
 
The rationale behind studying the Turkish downstream petroleum industry is to provide a 
detailed analysis through examining pricing mechanisms and market inefficiencies. 
Privatizations and deregulations in petroleum industries have resulted in restructuring of 
petroleum markets in many countries. Recent studies suggest that pricing asymmetries arising 
as a result of this restructuring are a cause of market inefficiency which is increasingly being 
analyzed by researchers in order to clarify this issue. Turkey has also gone through this 
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restructuring process and the pricing behavior and mechanisms in Turkish retail fuel market 
has always been discussed in terms of efficiency. The activities of regulatory mechanisms in 
the downstream petroleum sector is also worth to discuss since the resulting implementation 
of price ceiling on petroleum products in 2009 has been highly criticized in the sector. This 
research is expected to contribute to these discussions via providing empirical results of a 
market inefficiency namely; asymmetrical pricing behavior. On the other hand, it is crucial to 
analyze the roles of regulatory mechanisms since the refinery is a monopoly and it is the 
responsibility of these regulatory mechanisms to control and inspect the pricing behavior of 
the refinery and other players in the downstream market. Thus it is important to analyze and 
test for possible asymmetries arising in the Turkish downstream petroleum industry, and this 
paper aims to identify and examine this issue.  
What makes the Turkish petroleum market interesting to analyze is the monopoly position of 
the refiner and the oligopolistic structure of the downstream oil market. It can easily be 
suspected that lack of competitive market structure will cause market inefficiencies and 
abnormally high profits for the players in the market. It is also interesting to note that as a sole 
refiner in Turkey, TUPRAS has legal rights to set prices for their petroleum products up to 
3% above the Mediterranean average refinery product prices.  
On the other hand proportional taxation that exists in the petroleum market leads Turkish 
consumers to face one of the highest fuel pump prices in the world (highest in Europe). 
Taxation consists of value added taxes and special consumption taxes (levied on petroleum 
products). The fact that around 17% of all tax revenues of Turkish government stem from 
Petroleum taxes reduces the expectations of possible decreases in special consumption tax 
levied on petroleum products. Thus the fuel prices in Turkey are expected to remain as one of 
the highest in the world for the short term. It is also highly criticized that decreases in crude 
oil prices are not fully reflected to the final pump prices of petroleum products due to 
increases in taxes in these periods. 
All these characteristics of Turkish petroleum markets captured our interest to further analyze 
possible market inefficiencies via empirical analyses. Furthermore we will also direct the 
questions of how these market inefficiencies can be corrected and which stakeholders in these 
analyses have the obligation and power to prevent the existence of possible pricing 
asymmetries arising from inefficient market structure. 
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1.4 Research method 
 
The analysis of the Turkish downstream petroleum market is supported by an empirical 
analysis of weekly data that covers the period 2007 - 2009. The market efficiency is 
investigated in this work by using statistical and econometric tools such as the Dynamic 
Ordinary Least Squares (DOLS), the cointegration technique and the Error Correction Model 
(ECM) in order to examine the fuel price dynamics and the relationship between upstream 
and downstream prices. As an econometric modeling software, PC Give (Ox Metrics) has 
been used. The economic theory behind our empirical analysis relies on pricing asymmetry 
theory involving asymmetrical adjustment of downstream prices to changes in upstream 
prices.  
 
1.5 Structure 
 
The first part of the thesis presents an overview of Turkish petroleum industry mostly 
focusing on crude oil supply, demand and refinery sector. 
Chapter 3 gives an insight of Turkish downstream petroleum market by analyzing the market 
structure and the players in the market. Pricing structure and analyses are presented in Chapter 
4 by examining the refinery pricing as well as pricing of retailers together with taxation 
analysis. Regulatory mechanisms and their roles in the market are analyzed in chapter 5. 
Chapter 6 includes the empirical tools that are used in our analysis in order to test for possible 
pricing asymmetries followed by empirical analyses and the results of it in chapter 7. Finally, 
concluding remarks are presented in chapter 8.  
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2. OVERVIEW OF THE TURKISH PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 
2.1 Introduction 
 
According to BP Statistical Review (2010), 102 million tons (56,6%) of the current petroleum 
reserves are located in the Middle East, 16,9 million tons (9,4%) located in Africa and 10,2 
million tons (5,6%) located in the Russian Federation. Turkey has a strong geopolitical 
position in the sense that approximately 72% of the petroleum and natural gas reserves are 
located nearby the country. Thus this strategic position of Turkey is enabling the nation to 
serve as an energy hub in between continents.  
The oldest pipeline that Turkey owns is the Iraq-Turkey pipeline which carries petroleum 
from Iraq to the western part of Turkey. In 1999, around 305 million barrels of crude oil was 
flowing through this pipeline, however, as a result of sabotages and problems in Kerkuk the 
amount of crude oil that is carried through the pipeline decreased to 10,9 million barrels in 
2006. In 2009, 165 million barrels (23.3 million tons) of crude oil was transported through the 
pipeline. Turkey has another crude oil pipeline named Baku-Ceyhan-Tiblisi which has started 
to operate on 28
th
 of May 2006. The capacity of this pipeline increased to 1 million barrels per 
day in 2008, and in 2009 the capacity increased to 1.2 million barrels per day (Ministry of 
Energy and Natural Resources, 2009). 
 
2.2 Oil supply and demand in Turkey 
 
According to the Turkish Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources (2009), at the end of 
2009, petroleum reserves in Turkey was equal to 44,3 million tons. Compared to its neighbors 
such as Iran and Iraq, Turkey has relatively insignificant petroleum production and reserves to 
be self sufficient to its own industry (see appendix for oil production in Turkey and other 
OECD countries; Table 10.1). 
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Figure 2.1: Oil production and consumption in Turkey from 1999 – 2009 in million tons. 
 
Source: Pigm and BP stat review, 2010. 
 
The figure above shows the yearly production and consumption rates of petroleum in Turkey 
from 1999 to 2009. Petroleum consumption trend is mainly dependent on global crisis and 
inland energy demand. The production rates reveal that Turkey is highly dependent on 
petroleum imports since the production in 2009 which was 28,85 million tons only covered 
8% of the total consumption, which was 2,4 million tons. Turkey is an industrializing country 
and energy consumption is projected to be further increasing in the future. Thus, as a result of 
small amount of proven reserves in the country, Turkey is expected to be dependent on 
petroleum imports in the near future, in order to meet its energy demand. 
Figure 2.2 shows the amount of petroleum imports (in 1000s) for the years 2007, 2008 and 
2009 from different countries. According to the chart the largest petroleum exporting country 
to Turkey has been Russia for the years 2007 and 2009, whereas Iran took the leading 
exporting position in 2008. Due to decrease in petroleum demand resulting from the global 
crisis in 2009, petroleum exports from all countries diminished accordingly. The shares of 
largest oil exporting countries are highly dependent on international relations between Turkey 
and these countries as well as political stability and the distance to Turkey.  
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Figure 2.2: Crude oil imports of Turkey in thousand tons from 2007 to 2009. 
 
Source: EMRA petroleum sector annual report, 2009. 
  
Figure 2.3 shows the shares of the countries in total amount of petroleum imported by Turkey 
in 2009. Russia had the largest share in Turkish petroleum imports by 41%, followed by Iran 
(23%), Saudi Arabia (15%) and Iraq (12%) in 2009. Thus it can be observed that around 91% 
of the oil imports are coming from Russia and the Middle East. Ceyhan, a small town in the 
southern part of Turkey closed to Iraq border, is being used as a port for Iraqi oil exports. On 
the other hand, Turkey has close economics relationships with Russia in terms of energy, 
tourism and construction sectors. Russia is also one of the most significant natural gas 
exporters to Turkey. 
On the demand side of the petroleum market, the largest oil user sector is transport (49% of 
the total in 2008), and the growth in this sector has been the strongest from 2000 to 2008 with 
a rate of 32%. In this sector diesel is so far leading the sales of fuels by almost 59% of all road 
transport fuels in 2008 (IEA, 2009). 
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Figure 2.3: The share of oil exporting countries in total oil imports of Turkey in 2009. 
 
Source: EMRA petroleum sector annual report, 2009.  
 
2.3 Refinery sector 
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Refineries Corporation (TUPRAS). TUPRAS had continued its state monopoly position until 
January 2006 when it was privatized and the state owned monopoly has become privately 
owned monopoly by a joint conglomerate (Enerji Yatirimlari A.S.). 49% of the company 
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(20%), Opet Petrolculuk A.S. (3%), Shell Overseas Investment B.V. (1,9%) and the Shell 
Company of Turkey (0,1%). 
Iran 
23 % 
Russia 
41 % 
Saudi Arabia 
15 % 
Iraq 
12 % 
Kazakhistan 
4 % 
Syria 
1 % 
İtaly 
2 % 
England 
0 % 
Azerbaijan 
0 % Libya 
1 % 
Georgia 
0 % 
Nigeria 
1 % 
Shares of oil imports in 2009 
18 
 
Figure 2.4 shows the capacity of the four different refineries of TUPRAS and the crude oil 
based production in these refineries in 2007, 2008 and 2009. The refineries in Izmit, Izmir, 
Kirikkale and Batman have crude oil based production capacities of 11, 11, 5 and 1,1 million 
tons per year respectively. As we can see from the figure, production had steadily declined 
over this three year period mainly due to the crisis affecting the global economy. The capacity 
utilization rates for Izmir, Izmit, Kirikkale and Batman has been 100%, 96%, 64% and 73% in 
2007; 94%, 93%, 58% and 73% in 2008; 71%, 52%, 57% and 58% in 2009 respectively. The 
overall total capacity utilization rate for TUPRAS has been %91 %86 and %61 for the years 
2007, 2008 and 2009 respectively. It is quite observable from these figures that even when 
there is no crisis affecting the demand for petroleum products, most of the refineries are not 
operating with full capacity. 
 
Figure 2.4: Refinery capacities and crude oil based production figures of Izmit, Izmir, 
Kirikkale and Batman refineries for the years 2007, 2008 and 2009. 
 
Source: TUPRAS annual reports 2007,2008 and 2009. 
In order to analyze the monopoly power of TUPRAS in the Turkish downstream petroleum 
industry, procurement rates should be taken into consideration. Table 2.1 reveals the retailers’ 
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total sales and imports of different fuel types in Turkey. Moreover TUPRAS procurement rate 
explains how much of these sales consist of fuel types procured from TUPRAS. Data show 
that 66% of total fuel sales of retailers were procured from TUPRAS in 2008. It is also 
observed that, in 2008, around 89% of gasoline and fuel oil sales were procured from 
TUPRAS whereas only 58% of diesel sales were procured from TUPRAS. In 2009 TUPRAS 
procurement rates for gasoline, fuel oil and diesel products were 91%, 94% and 53% 
respectively. These results show that TUPRAS has a strong monopoly position, especially in 
gasoline and fuel oil markets in Turkey. As the sole refiner in Turkey, 60-65% of all fuel 
products sold in Turkey are produced and sold to retailers from TUPRAS, which yields a 
decisive position in terms of pricing structure in the Turkish downstream petroleum industry. 
 
Table 2.1: TUPRAS procurement rates of licensed retailers in 2008 and 2009. 
2008 
 Retail 
Sales 
Imports of 
Retailers 
Retail Sales (TUPRAS 
products) 
TUPRAS procurement 
rate 
Gasoline 2,23 0,33 1,89 0,85 
Diesel 13,57 5,67 7,91 0,58 
Fuel Oil 2,35 0,17 2,18 0,93 
TOTAL 18,16 6,18 11,98 0,66 
2009 
 Retail 
Sales 
Imports of 
Retailers 
Retail Sales (TUPRAS 
products) 
TUPRAS procurement 
rate 
Gasoline 2,19 0,20 1,98 0,91 
Diesel 13,71 6,47 7,24 0,53 
Fuel Oil 1,64 0,10 1,54 0,94 
TOTAL 17,54 6,77 10,77 0,61 
Source: EMRA petroleum sector annual report, 2009. 
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3. MARKET STRUCTURE IN TURKISH DOWNSTREAM 
PETROLEUM MARKET 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The Turkish downstream petroleum industry demonstrates the characteristics of an 
oligopolistic market structure in the sense that, in 2009, the market consisted of 43 active 
retailers while around 80% of the market share is divided among five big players namely; 
Petrol Ofisi, Shell, BP, Opet and Total.  
According to the Competition Authority in Turkey, there exist structural barriers to 
competition in the downstream market mainly due to lack of price competition among the 
distribution companies (IEA, 2009). In terms of ownership and right of use of fuel stations in 
the market, the owners of retail fuel stations in Turkey had been signing usufruct agreements 
with retail distributers lasting up to 20 years. The Energy Market Regulation Authority 
(EMRA) intends to increase the competition in the market further through enacting a usufruct 
law in limiting the usufruct contracts of fuel stations to 5 years. Thus, all the usufruct 
agreements lasting more than 5 years signed before 18.09.2010 are ending on 28
th
 of May 
2010 and the new usufruct agreements are limited to 5 years for the following years (EMRA, 
2009). This decision by the supervisory board is aiming to increase the competition in the 
market, further disturbing the oligopolistic structure. 
 
3.2 Top five players in the downstream market in terms of sales 
 
Petrol Ofisi: Petrol Ofisi had been formed in 1941 as a public company in order to meet the 
demand of public and private corporations as well as the end users. The company had been 
privatized in 2000 and in terms of retail network; Petrol Ofisi operates 2500 fuel stations in 
Turkey ranking 1
st
 in terms of retail network size. In 2010, OMV group acquired 96,98% of 
Petrol Ofisi’s shares. By the end of 2009, Petrol Ofisi owned licensed storage capacity of 
986405 m
3
 which constitutes 23,4% of total licensed storage capacity in Turkey (EMRA, 
2009). 
21 
 
Shell & Turcas: Shell stepped into the Turkish market in 1923 when the republic was 
founded. In 2006, Shell Company of Turkey was restructured and had been engaged in a joint 
venture with Turcas Petrol. As a result of this joint venture, retail and corporate sales 
segments of petroleum products had been reformed with 70% of Shell and 30% of Turcas 
Petrol shares. Turkey is categorized as one of the six strategic markets for Shell in 
downstream segment with more than 1200 fuel stations, ranking third among other Shell 
affiliates worldwide in terms of the size of retail network. By the end of 2009, Shell possessed 
licensed storage capacity of 220114 m3 that constitutes 5,2% of total licensed storage 
capacity in Turkey (EMRA, 2009). 
BP: BP’s operations in Turkey first started in 1912 as a result of company strategy via 
expanding emerging markets, especially after the discovery of petroleum in Iran. BP had 
played an active role in upstream and mid stream market as well; via 17% ownership of 
Mersin Refinery (until 1978) and exploration activities in Turkey together with Turkish state 
owned exploration and production company TPAO. However, the company focuses mainly 
on downstream market currently and operates 630 fuel stations together with 200 LPG gas 
stations in downstream market. By the end of 2009, BP owned licensed storage capacity of 
only 7535 m
3
. Additionally, BP owns a storage point for imported petroleum products in 
Bursa with a storage capacity of 26381 m
3
 (EMRA, 2009). 
Opet: The Company was established in 1982 by an entrepreneur who first operated locally in 
Mersin area and then moved to Istanbul in 1992. Opet has been growing successfully since 
the foundation of the company and 50% of which was owned by Koc Company by the end of 
2002. In terms of vertical integration, this ownership created competitive advantage for OPET 
especially after privatization of TUPRAS in 2006 (Koc Holding acquired 95% of corporate 
shares of TUPRAS and 3% of the corporate shares is owned by Opet). In terms of retail 
network size, Opet is the 3
rd
 largest fuel retailer in Turkey with more than 1200 fuel stations 
(including Sunpet). By the end of 2009, Opet possessed licensed storage capacity of 547000 
m
3
 constituting 13% of the licensed storage capacity in Turkey (EMRA, 2009). 
Total: Total and Elf companies had been operating in Turkey since 1992 and as a result of 
global merger between these companies Total Petroleum Turkey had been established in 
2002. Total operates around 450 fuel stations in Turkey. By the end of 2009, Total owned 
licensed storage capacity of 279275 m
3
 constituting 6,6% of the total storage capacity in 
Turkey (EMRA, 2009). 
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3.3 Market shares of top five players in the downstream market 
 
As explained in the previous sections, according to 2009 figures, 80% of the market share in 
the downstream market is distributed between five players namely; Petrol Ofisi, Shell, BP, 
Opet and Total whereas 43 players are actively operating in the market. 
Three global players in the world petroleum market with vertically integrated organization 
structures, namely Royal Dutch Shell (70% ownership of Shell&Turcas), BP and Total, retain 
around 35% of the market share in the Turkish downstream petroleum industry. 
 
Figure 3.1: Market share development in Turkish downstream petroleum market from 
2007 to 2009. 
 
Source: EMRA petroleum sector annual reports, 2007, 2008 and 2009. 
 
In terms of market shares, Petrol Ofisi is the market leader with 26,7% market share in 2009; 
however it has been losing its share against other competitors since 2007. Market shares of 
Shell & Turcas had been fairly stable from 2007 to 2009 moving around 19% that positions 
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for OPET from 2007 to 2009 in terms of market shares, as a result of completive advantage 
realization through vertical integration with TUPRAS and expansion strategy of the company. 
Opet’s market share increased from 15% to 18% from 2007 to 2009. BP is experiencing a loss 
in its market share from almost 13% in 2007 to 11% in 2009 whereas TOTAL‘s market share 
had been moving around 5% during these 3 years. It is also observed that the shares of other 
relatively small sized competitors had been increasing from 17% to 20% from 2007 to 2009 
indicating positive signs in terms of a more competitive market.  
 
3.4 Downstream sales figures of different fuel types 
 
In order to examine the consumption characteristics and patterns in the Turkish downstream 
petroleum industry, retail sales of the licensed players according to different fuel types will be 
examined in this section. 
Figure 3.2 reveals the total sales of fuel oil, diesel and gasoline types of fuels together with 
their shares in total sales of petroleum products in 2007, 2008 and 2009. 
According to EMRA (2009), around 75% of the fuel sales realized by licensed retailers 
consisted of diesel types of fuel. Figure 3.2 indicates that the sale of diesel types had been 
increasing from 2007 to 2009 whereas the sale of gasoline types was decreasing in the same 
period. Diesel types include industrial diesel used for industrial purposes and euro diesel used 
as fuel with low sulphur rates. On the other hand, the share of fuel oil types (mainly used for 
industrial purposes) decreased from 2007 to 2009, due to global crisis affected the industries 
utilizing this petroleum product in their production processes.   
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Figure 3.2: Sales of different petroleum products of licensed retailers in Turkey in tons 
for the years 2007, 2008 and 2009. 
 
Source: EMRA petroleum sector annual report, 2009. 
Notes: Gasoline types include; unleaded gasoline 95 and 98 octane plus leaded gasoline 95 
octane. Diesel Types include; euro diesel and industrial diesel. Fuel Oil Types include; Fuel 
oil 3,4,5 and 6                                  
  
The consumption trends among 95 octane unleaded gasoline and euro diesel (low sulphur) are 
represented in figure 3.3. The trends and consumption figures in the chart indicate that euro 
diesel consumption increased from 2007 to 2009 year by year whereas 95 octane unleaded 
gasoline consumption performed a decreasing trend over these years. Due to increasing prices 
of fuel over these periods (especially from 2007 to 2008), euro diesel consumption performs 
an increasing trend mainly because of more fuel saving technology of diesel engines and 
lower prices of diesel compared to gasoline products. 
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Figure 3.3: Consumption trends of 95 octane unleaded gasoline and Euro diesel (low 
sulphur diesel) in million m
3
 from 2007 to 2009. 
 
Source: EMRA petroleum sector annual report, 2009. 
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4. PRICING ANALYSIS IN THE DOWNSTREAM MARKET 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In this section, we will analyze the pricing behavior in the Turkish downstream petroleum 
industry in detail and compare it with the price developments in other countries. What 
comprises the pump prices of fuels are refinery prices, retailer and distributor margins and 
taxes. We will analyze the price developments in each one of these phases and comment on 
their contribution to the end user price. 
 
4.2 Refinery pricing 
 
TUPRAS, as the sole refinery in Turkey, has strong power in terms of pricing petroleum 
products of its own. 
 
Figure 4.1: Pre-tax refinery prices in Turkey, England and USA in Turkish liras per 
liter from 2005 to 2009. 
 
Source: Gokdemir, 2010. 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
 Turkey 0,54 0,67 0,71 0,91 0,74 
England 0,51 0,63 0,67 0,76 0,66 
USA 0,63 0,8 0,79 0,94 0,7 
0 
0,1 
0,2 
0,3 
0,4 
0,5 
0,6 
0,7 
0,8 
0,9 
1 
TL
/L
IT
ER
 
Pre-tax refinery price development of Unleaded Gasoline in Turkey, England & USA   
27 
 
On the other hand, as we’ve discussed earlier in section 2, around 90% of the crude oil 
demand of Turkey is met by imports. Taking this into consideration, we could expect that 
refinery prices should be in line with fluctuations in the world market. 
As inferred from Figure 4.1, pre-tax refinery prices of unleaded gasoline in Turkey have been 
almost fairly in line with the prices in USA and England. The refinery prices of unleaded 
gasoline prices were lower than the prices in USA and higher than the refinery prices in 
England until 2009. In 2009, the decline in pre-tax refinery prices of unleaded gasoline in 
Turkey was not as strong as the decline in other countries. It is observed that the pre-tax 
refinery price is realized as 0,74 TL/Liter in 2009; 0,04 TL/Liter higher than the price 
observed in USA.  
 
Figure 4.2: Profit margin figures of Mediterranean average and TUPRAS in dollars per 
barrel from 2005 to 2009. 
 
Source: Gokdemir, 2010. 
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of TUPRAS starting from 2005 to 2009 in comparison with the Mediterranean average 
margin from figure 4.2. The profit margin of TUPRAS for the years 2005 and 2006 follow a 
similar pattern as the Mediterranean average margin. However, TUPRAS realized a steep 
margin increase for the years 2007 and 2008 as opposed to negligibly small average margin 
increase in Mediterranean refineries. This figure and margin movements imply that TUPRAS 
has increased its profit margin after the refinery was privatized in the beginning of 2006 
further above the average Mediterranean average profit margin. This margin increase is 
noteworthy and will be discussed in the conclusions part while discussing the possible 
asymmetries arising in the Turkish downstream petroleum industry. 
 
4.3 Retailer and distributor pricing 
 
On the other hand, pump price of fuels also consists of different components other than 
refinery price. Refineries sell their products to retailers with refinery exit price and then retail 
companies add a margin on the refinery exit prices which constitutes the retail price of these 
petroleum products. Eventually, retail companies sell these petroleum products to their 
licensed distributors and the distributors also add a margin to this price. Additionally, taxes 
are levied on the sum of refinery exit price, retail margin and distributor margin contributing 
to the final pump price.  
Figure 4.3 indicates that taxes constituted around 55% of the pump price of diesel in Turkey 
for the years 2007, 2008 and 2009. It is also noteworthy that distributor and retail margins 
both constitute around 7% of the pump price. On the other hand, around 30% of the pump 
price of diesel in Turkey reflects the crude oil prices plus refinery margin. 
As we can observe from the figure, retail wholesale margin and distributor margin remained 
almost stable for this three year period, whereas the shares of refinery price and tax on the 
final pump price of diesel in Turkey has been changing over this three years period. 
 
 
29 
 
Figure 4.3: Shares of tax, distributor price, retail whole sale price and refinery price on 
diesel pump prices in Turkey for the first day of 2007, 2008 and 2009. 
 
Source: EMRA petroleum sector annual reports, 2007, 2008 and 2009. 
  
For further discussions of results of our empirical analysis in the following chapters, it is 
important to note that the share of tax on diesel pump prices increased for the year 2009 
compared to the share in 2008. This increase in the share of tax is observed in the period 
where the crude oil prices were declining due to the recession and during this decrease, 
government captured a higher share of final pump price by simply levying more tax on 
petroleum products. 
On the other hand, it is also crucial to compare the retailer and distributor pricing and their 
shares in the final pump price of diesel without tax with other countries. Figure 4.4 represents 
the retailer and distributer pricing of Turkey, UK and the US in Turkish Liras per liter. It is 
observed from the figure that retail and distributor prices are significantly higher than the 
prices in UK and the US. On average, distributer and retailer prices are 2,5 times higher than 
the prices in UK and the US. Gokdemir (2010) suggested in his paper that the reason behind 
this difference in retail and distributor prices is mainly due to the differences in costs in these 
countries. In contrast to many other countries, the fuel stations in Turkey are not self service 
stations and the fuel stations in Turkey employ pumpers, car washers etc. increasing the 
operating costs. On the other hand, the locations of storage facilities and the refineries in 
0 % 
10 % 
20 % 
30 % 
40 % 
50 % 
60 % 
70 % 
80 % 
90 % 
100 % 
2007 2008 2009 
Tax 
Distributor price 
Retail wholesale price 
Refinery price 
30 
 
different countries also affect the costs of retailers and distributers causing differences in 
retailer and distributor prices.  
 
Figure 4.4: Comparison of retailer and distributor pricing together on the pump price of 
diesel without tax in Turkish Liras per liter between Turkey, UK and the US. 
 
Source: Gokdemir, 2010 
  
However it is also important to note from Figure 4.4 that retailer and distributor prices 
together had been mostly resilient to the crude oil price fluctuations from 2007 to 2009, 
whereas UK and the US prices fluctuated more in line with crude oil price changes in the 
same period. On the other hand, it is obvious that the significant decrease in crude oil prices 
from 2008 to 2009 was not reflected notably to the retailer and distributor pricing in Turkey. 
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4.4 Taxes 
 
It is a fact that the pump prices of fuels in Turkey are the highest compared with the other 
European countries and Turkish consumers are paying around 60% of the final pump price as 
taxes to the government (PETDER, 2009).  
 
Figure 4.5: The value of tax in Euros per liter on final pump prices of fuel in Turkey and 
EU from 2007 to 2009. 
 
Source: Gokdemir, 2010. 
 
0 
0,2 
0,4 
0,6 
0,8 
1 
1,2 
Unleaded 
Gasoline 
Diesel Unleaded 
Gasoline 
Diesel Unleaded 
Gasoline 
Diesel 
TURKEY EU Difference 
2007 1,022 0,73 0,78 0,596 0,242 0,134 
2008 1,042 0,758 0,776 0,617 0,266 0,141 
2009 1,043 0,676 0,742 0,535 0,301 0,141 
Eu
ro
 
The value of tax on final pump prices in Turkey & EU 
32 
 
When we look at the taxes levied on fuels in EU and compare them with the figures in 
Turkey, in 2009 we observe that the taxes in Turkey account for 1,043 Euros per liter for 
unleaded gasoline and 0,676 Euros per liter for diesel, whereas in EU taxes on pump prices of 
unleaded gasoline are 0,742 Euros per liter and the taxes on diesel are 0,535 Euros per liter. 
These figures imply that the tax revenue stemming from a liter of unleaded gasoline and 
diesel consumption in Turkey is, respectively, 41% and 26% higher than the tax revenue in 
EU. 
It is also important to point out the significance of tax revenues stemming from petroleum 
products in terms of share of total tax income in Turkey. Taxes levied on fuels in Turkey 
could be categorized in two; Special consumption tax and value added tax (18%). Addition of 
special consumption tax to the normal value added tax levied on all petroleum products sold 
in the market constitutes the most significant income source for the Turkish government in 
terms of tax income.  
 
Figure 4.6: Contribution of special consumption tax and value added tax to the final pump 
prices of 95 octane unleaded gasoline and diesel in Turkey. 
 
Source: EMRA petroleum sector annual report, 2009. 
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Unlike value added tax, special consumption tax is an excise tax levied on petroleum 
products. It was introduced in 2002 with special consumption tax law and has been subject to 
many changes until now. When it was first introduced in 2002, the council of ministers set 
special consumption tax to 0,739 TL/liter for 95 octane unleaded gasoline and 0,516 TL/liter 
for Diesel. The last change that occurred in special consumption tax was at the end of 2009 
and the special consumption tax on 95 octane unleaded gasoline and diesel increased to 
1,8915 TL/liter 1,3045 TL/liter respectively (Gokdemir, 2010). As we can observe from these 
figures, special consumption tax on gasoline and diesel has increased around 155%, since the day 
it is first introduced in 2002.  
As we can observe from Figure 4.5, by the end of 2009, 66% of the pump price of 95 octane 
unleaded gasoline and 58% of the pump price of diesel is constituted of taxes. On the other hand 
special consumption tax constitutes 51% of the pump price of 95 octane gasoline and 43% of the 
pump price of diesel, whereas value added tax constitutes 15% of the pump price of each 
petroleum product. 
Thus it can be stated that taxes constitute the most significant portion of the final pump prices in 
Turkey. Moreover, the introduction of special consumption tax has provided a significant tax 
source for the government and special tax consumption tax has increased many times since the 
day it is introduced.  
 
Table 4.1: Total government tax revenue and fuel taxes in Turkey in billion Turkish 
Liras from 2007 to 2009. 
Years Total Taxes on Fuel 
Government  Tax 
Income 
Share of Fuel Tax on 
Total government tax 
income 
 VAT + Special 
Consumption Tax 
  
2007 26,0 152,8 17,0% 
2008 28,5 168,1 16,9% 
2009 29,5 172,4 17,1% 
Source: Gokdemir, 2010. 
  
The above table reveals the development of tax revenue over the years 2007, 2008 and 2009 
as well as the development of share of fuel tax over total tax revenue of Turkish government. 
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As it may be observed, tax revenues stemming from fuel consumption, increased over the 
years and the share of fuel tax revenue over the total tax revenue of government also slightly 
increased from 2007 to 2009. It is important to note that in 2009, due to global crisis, fuel 
prices were declining and there had been a notable decrease in fuel consumption in Turkey. 
Nevertheless, tax revenue stemming from fuel consumption increased in 2009, due to 
increases in special consumption tax that is levied on petroleum products, especially in the 
period of price ceiling regulation. 
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5. REGULATION IN TURKISH PETROLUEM INDUSTRY 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The Turkish downstream petroleum industry is being regulated by different regulatory 
mechanisms in order to ensure a well functioning market. The preparation and 
implementation of energy policies, plans and programs are under the control of The Ministry 
of Energy and Natural Resources.  This process is coordinated with the help of its affiliated 
institutions such as the Energy Market Regulation Authority and the Competition Authority 
together with other public and private entities (IEA, 2009).  
The Turkish downstream petroleum market is being regulated under the law 5015 which 
became effective in 2003. This law enabled the market to further liberalize by abolishing the 
automatic pricing mechanism and allowing the players to set prices via referencing the 
international prices (Gokdemir, 2010). The aforementioned automatic pricing mechanism 
obligated the state owned refineries to set their prices automatically according to the 
fluctuations in the crude oil markets via a set formula. As stated in the new law, it is aimed to 
enhance the competition in the market and reorganize the sector in order to comply with 
international norms and standards. This law has also enabled the certified corporations to 
purchase petroleum products freely. In terms of vertical integration, the law allows the owners 
of the refineries to sell their products through their own retail stations; however the refinery is 
also obliged to provide same market conditions (pricing, quantity etc.) to the other retailers as 
well. In terms of refinery pricing, the law enables the refinery to set its petroleum product 
prices above 3% of the CIF Mediterranean prices. 
Retailers are also bounded with this law in terms of enhancing the competition among them. 
The petroleum law 5015 states that the market share of a single retailer can not exceed 45% of 
the total market. On the other hand, the ownership of fuel stations is also regulated under this 
law in order to increase the competition in the sector. The law states that the sales of retailer 
owned stations can not exceed 15% of the total market share of the retailer. 
As we stated previously, the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources is responsible for 
implementation of energy policies, plans and laws. On the other hand, assurance and control 
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of these policies and laws are being held by affiliated institutions acting as supporting 
mechanisms. The main stakeholders in our regulation analysis of Turkish downstream oil 
industry are the Energy Market Regulation Authority and the Competition Authority. In the 
following sections we will give more insight to their functioning and impacts on the industry. 
 
5.2 The Competition Authority 
 
The Competition Authority was established in 1997 in order to secure competitive conditions 
in markets with the aim of increasing social welfare via ensuring efficient resource allocation. 
As stated in the Competition Authority’s official website (2010), the goal of the institution is 
to facilitate and secure competition in all markets. Responsibilities of this independent 
institution are: 
 to penalize undertakings which distort or prevent competition in the market, through 
examination and investigation processes subject to detailed regulation, 
 to grant exemption and to prepare secondary regulations for agreements which are in 
conflict with competition rules but are beneficial for the economy and the consumers, 
 to prevent monopolization within the market by examining mergers, acquisitions and 
joint-ventures over a certain threshold, 
 to examine the transfer of public undertakings to the private sector in the privatization 
stages, and through privatization, to reduce the effects of the state on the economy while 
preventing monopolization in the areas the public sector exits, 
 to ensure the dominance of competitive conditions within the markets by expressing 
opinions on various acts and regulations which would negatively affect or restrict 
competition in the markets to government institutions and organizations concerned. 
In 2008, EMRA requested the Competition Authority to publish a fuel sector report in order 
to examine the price movements in the downstream market. The results of this inspection 
suggest that there is evidence of pricing asymmetries in Turkish downstream market due to 
slower adjustments of fuel prices to decreases in crude oil prices both at refinery and retail 
price levels. The report also suggests that the refinery (TUPRAS) has gained further market 
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power and a strong price setting position after the privatization. According to this sector 
report, the Competition Authority concluded that TUPRAS’s petroleum product prices are 
being observed above the referenced CIF Mediterranean average prices, however still in the 
range of 3% as stated in the law (Gunduz et al., 2008). 
As a result of this report, the Competition Authority concluded that the refinery (TUPRAS) is 
pricing its products in line with the related petroleum law; however there is no concluding 
remark whether the refinery is asymmetrically adjusting its product prices to the changes in 
crude oil prices. Thus the report suggested no sanction to the refinery as it follows the allowed 
pricing strategy in the law. The report also concluded about the retail sector that there is lack 
of competition and the retail and distributor prices are above the European average. It is also 
noted that downward movements of crude oil prices are not as much reflected to the retail and 
distributor prices as upward movements. It is included in the report that the costs in Turkey 
might reflect the high downstream and retail prices, however, due to the structural problems 
existing in the retail market, the Competition Authority suggested EMRA to use it regulatory 
power. 
 
5.3 The Energy Market Regulation Authority 
 
The Energy Market Regulation Authority (EMRA) was established in 2001 via the Electricity 
Market Law as an independent regulatory authority for the utility sector. After the enactment 
of Petroleum law 5015, EMRA was given responsibility to regulate the petroleum sector as 
well. The decision making body consist of a board which is composed of nine members, 
including a chairperson and a vice chairperson (IEA, 2009). EMRA is responsible to secure a 
well operating efficient market through inspections and regulations.  
Before the enactment of petroleum law 5015, the upstream and downstream sectors were both 
regulated via the previous law and the former law was more concerned with the upstream 
sector, paying less consideration to the downstream sector. However, the enactment of the 
new law assigned EMRA as independent regulatory authority and enabled the downstream 
market to be regulated more in detail allowing a more liberal market. 
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EMRA is also responsible to ensure competitive pricing policies of the stakeholders in the 
downstream petroleum market. One of the most important responsibilities of this institution is 
to inspect whether the prices of the refinery products and pump prices are in line with the 
fluctuations in crude oil prices. In case of unexpected price movements in the market allowing 
the players to retain abnormal profits, it is EMRA’s responsibility to conduct inspections 
regarding the situation and implement sanctions to the responsible stakeholders. 
In 2008, due to public opinion towards high fuel prices and asymmetric price adjustments to 
decreases in crude oil prices, EMRA authorized the Competition Authority to inspect the 
market and to submit a detailed report regarding the situation. The Competition Authority 
submitted the report in three months and as stated in this report, it is noted that there is lack of 
competition in the retail market and the players do not follow the global price movements. In 
terms of refinery pricing, it is indicated that the refinery (TUPRAS) followed the 3% mark-up 
rule in this period, however some evidence found that the refinery pricing also exhibited 
deviations from the world prices within this 3% mark-up pricing (Gunduz et al. 2008). 
Conclusively, the petroleum law allows the refinery to set the prices within the 3% corridor of 
the CIF Mediterranean average prices, thus EMRA concluded that sanctions should be 
implemented to the retailers and distributors in order to overcome this inefficiency of the 
market. 
In 2009, EMRA imposed a ceiling price for the pump price of the petroleum products starting 
from the end of June until the end of August. In this period of two months, the ceiling prices 
of the petroleum products are set daily with a formula including CIF Mediterranean average 
price. The period ended in August 2009 and as a result, the distributor and retailer margins 
decreased, however in the same period special consumption tax was increased. Thus the 
resulting decrease in distributor and retailer margin had been transferred to the government as 
tax revenue. 
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6. ECONOMETRIC TOOLS TO TEST THE PRICING 
ASYMMETRY 
 
The empirical study of pricing asymmetry analysis of the Turkish downstream petroleum 
industry requires the use of advanced econometric tools and concepts that we will be defined 
in this chapter. Furthermore, we will explain the need and the goals of using such methods. 
The market efficiency will be investigated empirically by using ADF tests on fuel prices and 
Brent price of crude oil as well as using cointegration analysis and asymmetric ECM theory. 
The rationale behind asymmetry analysis is to test for a market inefficiency resulting from a 
slower adjustment of downstream prices to decreases in upstream prices whereas the increases 
in upstream prices are quickly transmitted to downstream prices. As we will discuss in further 
sections, the tools of econometrics will be utilized first to check for stationarity of the data, 
followed by cointegration analysis and finally concluded with estimating the asymmetric error 
correction model in order to test for possible asymmetries. 
Empirical analysis will be followed by a concluding part where we will discuss the results of 
our analysis. Further discussion will be based on possible roots of asymmetries if there exist 
any in the Turkish downstream petroleum industry.  
The phenomenon of asymmetric transmission of decreases in upstream prices to downstream 
prices is widely believed by consumers. Increasing fluctuations of crude oil prices starting 
from the second half of the twenty first century due to recessions, wars and resulting 
petroleum supply crisis affected the price of fuel products as well. However, these 
fluctuations also attracted the stakeholders to obtain possible gains resulting in asymmetries 
of price adjustments in the petroleum industries. 
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6.1 Literature review  
 
The literature on pricing asymmetry analysis of crude oil and fuel prices is wide in terms of 
country specific analysis using monthly, weekly and daily data. Dynamic regression models 
are applied to test for possible asymmetries arising from different reasons. 
Bacon (1991) is considered to be the first in literature to analyze the problem of asymmetrical 
responses of gasoline products to decreases in upstream prices. In his analysis, the focus was 
on UK gasoline market, and weekly data was used in order to analyze the possible 
asymmetries for the period 1982-1989. Slower adjustment of retail prices to decreases in 
crude oil prices in UK is found in his paper for the period inspected which indicated an 
existing asymmetry. 
Manning (1991) has also analyzed the UK gasoline market in order to test for possible 
asymmetries. He utilized monthly data instead of weekly data and extended the period 
analyzed to 1973-1988. The results of the dynamic ECM suggested that there existed weak 
and non-persistent asymmetry for the periods investigated. 
The possible asymmetric adjustment of price changes in Germany is analyzed by 
Kirchgässner and Kübler (1992) for the period 1972-1989. The specified period is analyzed 
by using monthly data and investigating two sub-periods; namely before and after 1980. The 
results of this analysis reveal short-run asymmetries for the first sub period (before 1980). 
However, the data for second period do not suggest asymmetries in prices. It is also argued 
that the reductions in petroleum prices are transferred faster than the increases due to the 
effects of politicians and trade unions. 
Dufy-Deno (1996) analyzed the US market by simply investigating the price adjustments 
between wholesale and retail gasoline prices without tax. Weekly data is used in this analysis 
to test for the period 1989-1993. The results reveal that there exist strong asymmetries, 
implying slower adjustment of retail prices to decreases in upstream prices than to increases. 
The US gasoline market had also been investigated by Borenstein et al. (1997) for the periods 
1986-1992 by using weekly data. The results of this analysis support the short run 
asymmetries arising from quicker retail price reaction to increases than to decreases in crude 
oil prices.   
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Balke et al. (1998) brought a different perspective to asymmetry analysis by analyzing the 
effect of model specification in these empirical investigations. It is suggested by the author’s 
analysis that the results of asymmetry analysis are sensitive to model selection. However the 
results support the existence of asymmetry in different confidence levels. Distributed lag 
models suggest weak asymmetry whereas ECM indicates persistent asymmetry for the period 
chosen. 
The analysis of Bacon (1991) on UK gasoline had also gained attention by Reilly and Witt 
(1998). The authors used monthly data for the period 1982-1995 in order to analyze the 
possible effects of exchange rate (pound and dollar) on asymmetry analysis. The results still 
suggested short-run asymmetries for the period rejecting the hypothesis of exchange rate 
effects on the asymmetry found in the specified period. 
Similar analysis of asymmetric price relationships in gasoline markets had been conducted by 
Godby et al. (2000) focusing on the Canadian market. Weekly data for thirteen different cities 
are used in this analysis for the period 1990-1996. The results suggest symmetrical responses 
of downstream prices to changes in upstream prices for the periods investigated.  
The analysis of the US market has been extended by Borenstein and Shepard (2002). The 
effects of changes in crude oil prices had been asymmetrically transmitted to the terminal 
prices in the US for the period 1986-1992. 
Backmeier and Griffin (2003) conducted an asymmetrical price change analysis of the US 
market similar to Borenstein et al. (1997). However the two approaches differ in the sense that 
Bachmeier and Griffin (2003) used Engle-Granger two step method and daily data, whereas 
Borenstein et al. (1997) had used weekly data and non standard distribution. As expected, the 
results differed from what Borenstein et al. (1997) suggested in their work. The authors found 
no signs of asymmetry for the US market over the period 1985-1998. 
Similarly, Kaufmann and Laskowski (2005) examined the US market by using monthly data 
for the period January 1986 – December 2002. The authors applied asymmetric ECM in order 
to test for possible asymmetries. Partial evidence was found in this analysis suggesting 
asymmetries on different petroleum products. 
Contín-Pilart et al. (2008) investigated the Spanish retail gasoline market for the period 1993-
2004. The authors applied multivariate error correction models in order to capture possible 
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asymmetries arising after the abolishment of state monopoly refinery. The results of the paper 
suggested symmetric response of retail gasoline prices to both increases and decreases in the 
upstream prices for the period investigated as well as two other sub periods (January 1993 - 
September 1998 and October 1998 – December 2004).  
 
6.2 Describing price dynamics 
 
In this part we will define the concepts describing the dynamics of empirical data and the 
different econometric tools that we will use in order to analyze the market efficiency in the 
Turkish downstream petroleum industry. 
Firstly, the regression method, properties and assumptions of the dynamic ordinary least 
square estimations that we are going to use extensively will briefly be presented. 
 
6.3 Dynamic OLS method 
 
In our analysis we have applied Dynamic OLS (Stock & Watson, 1993) in order to build a 
cointegration model via using “PC Give” econometric modeling software. The reason behind 
applying Dynamic OLS estimation is to reduce the small sample bias and to provide 
asymptotically efficient estimates for cointegrated variables. This application includes 
introducing lags and leads into the equation and choosing the model that maximizes the 
equation 2 log(L) – k log(n) where L is the likelihood function, k is the number of parameters 
to estimate, n is the number of observations and log(.) is the Naperian logarithm (Contín-
Pilart et al., 2008). 
The inclusion of lagged values can also eliminate the autocorrelation due to the fact that the 
effect of a change in the explanatory variable might only be observed after a period of time. 
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6.4 Stationarity and unit root testing 
 
In our analysis, stationarity concept is significant to prove that the models that we built via 
using the data we’ve chosen do not produce spurious regressions through non-stationary data. 
Thus we will apply Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) Test in order to prove that the process is 
stationary as well as to conduct unit root test. 
The stationarity of data implies market efficiency thus the models that we built on in order to 
correct these inefficiencies will be based on stationary data. Non stationary data could be 
corrected as stationary by applying first difference operator. Thus by applying unit root test to 
the data we use, we could conclude that the data are stationary or non-stationary and if the 
data are non stationary, we could check whether they have unit roots or not. If the first 
difference operator is stationary, then we can conclude that the data contain one unit root and 
are integrated of order 1 to induce stationarity (i.e. yt ~ I(1) and ∆yt ~ I(0)). 
The rationale behind the ADF test is to compare the t-statistics for δ against a non-standard 
distribution in order to conclude whether the series contain a unit root or not (MacKinnon, 
1996). In order to carry out the unit root tests we have built the below model and perform it 
for each variable: 
 
 (EQ1)   ∆yt = α + βt +  yt-1 +    
 
   ∆yt-i + εt 
 
In this equation, t is the linear time trend, ∆ is the first difference operator, ε is the random 
error term, and k is the order of the augmentation in order to eliminate correlation in the 
residuals of the regression.  
In our analysis we will use the Akaike Information Criterion in order to determine the optimal 
number of lags in our tests and regressions (Akaike, 1974). 
 
AIC = -2*ln (likelihood) + 2*k 
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In this equation k is equal to degrees of freedom of the model. Fit is measured negatively by 
2*ln (likelihood) (i.e. the larger the value the worse the fit). On the other hand, complexity is 
measured positively by 2*k. The model with the smallest value of the Akaike Information 
Criterion is chosen to be better given the fact that two models fit on the same data. 
 
6.5 Cointegration analysis 
 
In order to prove the existence of a long run relationship between fuel prices in Turkey and 
Brent crude oil prices, cointegration analysis is applied. Theory suggests that crude oil prices 
and fuel prices are expected to be in a long term relationship in an efficient market. In other 
words, price shocks originating from crude oil prices could also have an effect on fuel prices 
in the long term in an efficient market. 
In our analysis we applied Engle Granger Test (Engle and Granger, 1987) in order to test 
whether there exists cointegration between fuel prices and Brent crude oil prices. We first 
assume that there is a stable long-term relationship between fuel prices in Turkey and Brent 
crude oil prices and used the model below to test for cointegration. 
 
(EQ2)   yt = θ0 + θ1xt + ut 
 
In this equation y is the variable used for fuel price in Turkish liras per liter and x is the Brent 
crude oil prices in Turkish liras per liter. According to the test, the stationarity of the residuals 
ut will prove that these two variables are cointegrated and tend towards long run equilibrium.  
In order to reduce small sample bias and to provide asymptotically efficient estimates for 
cointegrated variables we extended the equation 2 and introduced the equation 1 (i.e. dynamic 
OLS regression). Thus the steady state long run relationship between fuel prices in Turkey 
and Brent crude oil prices are represented in equation 1.  
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6.6 Asymmetric ECM 
 
In the literature, there are three popular methods designed to describe asymmetric price 
behavior, namely asymmetric error correction model (asymmetric ECM), autoregressive 
threshold ECM and ECM with threshold cointegration (Grosso and Manera, 2007). 
In our analysis, we applied asymmetric ECM method in order to test for possible pricing 
asymmetries in the Turkish downstream Petroleum Industry. Given the existence of 
cointegration and long term relationship between two variables, it is possible to build an error 
correction model in order to analyze price asymmetries arising from different factors. Thus 
the below asymmetric ECM equation represents a steady state relation among the variables: 
 
(EQ3)   ∆yt = Φ
+
 EC
+
t-1 + Φ
-
 EC
-
t-1 +    
 
   ∆xt-1 +    
 
   ∆yt-1 + εt 
 
In this equation, ECt-1 is defined as first difference operator from the steady state 
cointegration relationship, which is the lagged residual from equation 1. Following Bachmeier 
and Griffin (2003), Kaufmann and Laskowski (2005) and Palacios, Contín-Pilart and Correljé 
(2008), we decomposed the error correction term based on changes in Brent crude oil prices: 
 
EC
+
t = ECt  if ∆xt > 0 
EC
-
t = ECt  if  ∆xt ≤ 0 
 
In this conditional equation, ∆xt = xt – xt-1 is referring to changes in the levels of x. Thus by 
decomposing error correction term and introducing lagged variables into equation, our ECM 
model is able to capture the price dynamics and asymmetries arising. Asymmetric behavior is 
being tested by establishing the joint hypothesis H0: Φ
+
= Φ-. In order to test for asymmetries 
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with this joint hypothesis, we apply Wald Test and compare the F statistics. The rejection of 
this hypothesis indicates the existence of price asymmetry. 
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7. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
7.1 Data 
 
In our analysis of market efficiency and price asymmetries in the Turkish downstream 
petroleum industry, we will use the weekly average Euro diesel prices as representative of 
fuel pump prices (final prices of refinery products) from the beginning of 2007 until the end 
of 2009. The reason behind that is, by 2009, Euro diesel fuel type sales constituted 21,37% of 
all petroleum based fuel sales in Turkey that is more than the total of 95 and 98 octane 
gasoline sales (13,75%) (EMRA, 2009). We will include both before and after tax prices of 
Euro diesel in order to analyze possible asymmetries arising from taxation and other factors. 
For the purpose of testing whether the downstream prices respond symmetrically to changes 
in upstream prices, we will include Brent crude oil prices into our analysis as representative of 
upstream prices. Brent crude oil prices are represented in US dollars per barrel; however 
Turkish downstream prices (pump price of diesel) are represented in Turkish liras per liter. 
Thus firstly, we converted the US dollars per barrel values to US dollars per liter in order to 
conduct our analysis on the same unit of measurement. Secondly, Brent crude oil prices of US 
dollars per liter are converted into Turkish liras per liter via simply using the exchange rate 
for the respective date of observation. The rationale behind the latter conversion is to 
eliminate the possible effects of exchange rate fluctuations. 
As it can be inferred from figure 7.1, in general, fluctuations in pump prices of diesel has been 
fairly in line with the fluctuations in Brent crude oil prices exchanged into Turkish Liras. 
However, by applying pricing asymmetry analysis and dividing the observations into two sub 
periods, the magnitude of the responses of downstream prices to the changes in upstream 
prices could be examined. Accordingly, asymmetric price adjustments could be proven 
statistically through the evaluation of the data with utilizing relevant econometric modeling 
namely; asymmetric error correction model. 
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Figure 7.1: Trend lines of diesel prices with tax, without tax and Brent crude oil prices. 
 
Note: TR Diesel TI refers to the Euro diesel price with tax in Turkish liras per liter, TR Diesel 
–t refers to the Euro diesel price without tax in Turkish liras per liter and TL/Liter refers to 
the Brent crude oil prices in Turkish liras per liter. 
 
The number of observations included in these analysis amounts to 156 and we will also divide 
the period between 2007 and 2009 into 2 sub periods (78 observations each) in order to 
analyze possible asymmetries in these different period of times.    
The sample of weekly retail diesel prices includes a sufficient number of data to obtain 
desirable statistical properties using the regressions and OLS method. However, the strength 
of the tests would diminish with sub period analysis with lower number of data.  
Table 7.1 reveals the main descriptive statistics for diesel prices in Turkey and Brent crude oil 
prices in Turkish liras per liter. As we could observe, retail diesel prices (both with tax and 
without tax) have shown more volatility in sub period 1 compared to sub period 2 however 
the volatility of Brent crude oil price in Turkish liras per liter has remained more stable in 
terms of standard deviations.  
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Table 7.1: Descriptive statistics of retail diesel prices in Turkey and Brent crude oil 
prices. 
 Sub Period 1 Sub Period 2 Whole Sample 
 Retail diesel prices with tax (in TL/Liter) 
Observation 78 78 156 
Mean 2,5968 2,676 2,6364 
Std Dev  0,30438 0,22879 0,27215 
Skewness 0,9766 0,70016 0,77233 
Excess Kurtosis -0,26104 0,074182 -0,24119 
Min 2,25 2,34 2,25 
Max 3,32 3,29 3,32 
 Retail diesel prices without tax (in TL/Liter) 
Observation 78 78 156 
Mean 1,2427 1,2144 1,2285 
Std Dev  0,23006 0,19871 0,21542 
Skewness 1,1237 1,2227 1,1927 
Excess Kurtosis 0,093044 0,7205 0,43799 
Min 0,98 0,98 0,98 
Max 1,82 1,78 1,82 
 Brent crude oil prices (in TL/Liter) 
Observation 78 78 156 
Mean 0,67533 0,63439 0,65486 
Std Dev  0,15016 0,15746 0,15521 
Skewness 1,0034 0,5784 0,73783 
Excess Kurtosis 0,066586 0,28242 0,26504 
Min 0,46133 0,34025 0,34025 
Max 1,0553 1,0911 1,0911 
 
The kurtosis measures whether data are peaked or flat relative to a normal distribution. Thus 
excess kurtosis measures the deviations from the kurtosis of a normal distribution which is 
equal to 3. We observe that the deviation from the kurtosis of a normal distribution is quite 
small in all variables which indicate more homogeneity in prices. 
Skewness is considered as a measure of symmetry. We observe a positive coefficient of 
skewness during all periods for all variables which means that the data have a longer right tail 
or are right skewed. 
Based on kurtosis and skewness, the normality of error term could be tested using the Jarque-
Bera test (Jarque and Bera, 1987). It tests for the coefficients of skewness and excess kurtosis 
being jointly equal to zero. 
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JB = n/6 (S
2
 + (K-3)/4) ~ χ2 
Where:  S = Coefficient of skewness  
             K = coefficient of excess kurtosis  
             n = number of observations 
Note: See Appendix; Table:10.2 for the Jarque-Bera Test Results. 
 
7.2 Empirical results 
7.2.1 Test for stationarity and unit roots 
 
In order to examine the stationarity of the time series data of diesel prices and Brent crude oil 
prices, unit root tests were conducted for each variable. 
Stationarity of variables is important for market efficiency analysis in order to build 
cointegration and error correction models. Thus we will first check if the data we use exhibit 
stationarity or non-stationarity by using ADF test with equation 1. 
 
(EQ1)   ∆yt = α + βt +  yt-1 +    
 
   ∆yt-i + εt                                              
 H0: δ=0 
H1: δ<0 
 
The model above was applied to all variables in all periods by simply inserting the time series 
data for each variable into the equation as the variable y. The choice of appropriate number of 
lags i to be used in the ADF test is determined by minimizing the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC).  
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The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the time series are stationary. On the other 
hand not rejecting the null hypothesis indicates the time series is non stationary and contains 
one unit root. 
 
Table 7.2: ADF test for weekly diesel prices and Brent crude oil prices. 
Period 
TRDti ∆TRDti TRD-t ∆TRD-t B ∆B 
Whole 
Sample 
-1.553 -10.24** -1.558 -10.46** -1.540 -11.47** 
1st Sub 
-1.454 -8.939** -1.337 -9.499** -0.6417 -10.19** 
2nd Sub 
-2.220 -7.359** -2.410 -7.293** -2.656 -8.530** 
Notes: B: Brent crude oil prices in TL/Liter, TRDti: Diesel prices (Tax included), TRD-t: 
Diesel prices without tax and ∆ indicates fist lag difference operator. Critical values are 5%= 
-3,47 and 1%= -4,08  
 
The null hypothesis of unit root is rejected when the test statistic is more negative than the 
critical value. Results on Table 7.2 reveals that all the variables contain one unit root while 
their first differences are stationary, indicating that all the variables are integrated of order one 
or I(1) for all periods. 
 
7.2.2 Test for cointegration 
 
In the case of time series data that are integrated of order one, there may exist a stable long 
run economic relationship between diesel prices in Turkey and Brent crude oil prices. The 
cointegration method allows us to investigate long term relationship between non stationary 
series. The logic behind cointegration test is to regress to non-stationary variables and test 
whether the residuals from this equation are stationary. 
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In order to test for cointegration we have applied the below model in which we regressed both 
diesel prices in Turkey with and without tax to Brent crude oil prices. 
 
(EQ2)   yt = θ0 + θ1xt + ut 
 
Then we stored the residuals from each equation and applied an ADF test for these residuals 
in order to check for stationarity. Equation 1 is estimated for all these residuals in order to 
apply the unit root test. 
 
(EQ1)   ∆yt = α + βt +  yt-1 +    
 
   ∆yt-i + εt     
 
 
Table 7.3: ADF test results for residuals from equation (1). 
Period Residuals TRDti Residuals TRD-t 
Whole Sample -2.487* -2.283* 
1st Sub -3.824** -4.619** 
2nd Sub -2.749** -2.310* 
Notes: TRDti: Diesel Prices (Tax included), TRD-t: Diesel Prices without tax.  
Critical values for the whole sample are 5%=-1.94 1%=-2.58   
Critical Values for the sub periods are 5%=-1.95 and 1%=-2.60.  
 
 
The results from the above table reveal that all the residuals are stationary indicating that they 
are integrated of order 0 or I(0). Thus we can conclude that both diesel prices in Turkey with 
and without taxes are cointegrated with Brent crude oil prices. 
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7.2.3 Modeling asymmetric ECM 
 
As a result of a cointegration relation existing between diesel prices and Brent crude oil 
prices, we could build our asymmetric ECM model in order to test for asymmetries between 
these two variables. Engle and Granger (1989), in their analysis, introduced decomposing the 
error terms in order to capture the short-run dynamics.  Thus by plugging in the lagged 
residuals from the steady state cointegration relationship which is equation (1) into the error 
correction model, we tested the price asymmetries for the Turkish downstream petroleum 
industry with the following asymmetric ECM model; 
 
(EQ3)   ∆yt = Φ
+
 EC
+
t-1 + Φ
-
 EC
-
t-1 +    
 
   ∆xt-1 +    
 
   ∆yt-1 + εt 
Where; 
EC
+
t = ECt  if ∆xt > 0 
EC
-
t = ECt  if  ∆xt ≤ 0 
 
In this conditional equation, ∆xt = xt – xt-1 refers to changes in the levels of x. Thus by 
decomposing the error correction term and introducing lagged variables into equation, our 
ECM model is able to capture the price dynamics, asymmetries arising. Asymmetric behavior 
is being tested by establishing the joint hypothesis H0: Φ
+
= Φ-. In order to test for 
asymmetries with this joint hypothesis, we apply Wald Test and compare the F statistics. The 
rejection of this hypothesis indicates the existence of price asymmetry. 
Thus we test; 
 
H0: Φ
+
= Φ-          against          HA: Φ
+≠Φ- 
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7.2.4 Results 
 
Table 7.4 shows the results of the asymmetric ECM model that we built on equation (3) where 
we tested the above hypothesis in order to observe possible asymmetries arising in the 
Turkish downstream petroleum industry between years 2007 and 2009. 
 
Table 7.4: Estimates of coefficients and test results of asymmetric ECM model. 
 Sub Period 1 Sub Period 2 Whole Sample 
 y = Retail diesel prices with tax (in TL/Liter) 
EC
+
t-1 -0,686209 (-3,01) -0,147784 (-0,691) -0,123440 (-1,73) 
EC
-
t-1 -0,650205 (-2,97) -0,417443 (-2,52) -0,173423 (-2,62) 
∆xt-1 
0,0171705 (0,171) 0,0880698 (0,771) 
0,000359262 
(0,00462) 
∆xt-2 - - - 
∆xt-3 - - - 
∆yt 0,437706 (2,45) 0,547735 (3,97) 0,504647 (4,62) 
∆yt-1 1,24859 (6,26) 0,481805 (2,99) 0,647422 (5,10) 
∆yt-2 - - - 
∆yt-3 - - - 
Sigma 0,0361636 0,045228 0,0425664 
D.W. 2,19 2,09 2,04 
Wald Test (F) 8.2495 [0.0006]** 3.2389 [0.0452]* 4.4462 [0.0134]* 
Observation 73 74 146 
 y = retail diesel prices without tax (in TL/Liter) 
EC
+
t-1 -1.03057 (-4.31) -0.208533 (-1.19) -0.127401 (-1.97) 
EC
-
t-1 -0.659627 (-2.98) -0.142735 (-1.19) -0.0883914 (-1.25) 
∆xt-1 -0.0121650 (-0.108) 0.0218197 (0.198) -0.0353478 (-0.460) 
∆xt-2 0.0418778 (0.444)   
∆xt-3 -   
∆yt 0.331025 (2.40) 0.491447 (4.59) 0.423994 (4.88) 
∆yt-1 1.04956 (6.95) 0.453936 (3.56) 0.567047 (5.71) 
∆yt-2 0.373744 (2.40)   
∆yt-3 -   
Sigma 0.027606 0.0352423 0.0339952 
D.W. 1.92 2.19 2.13 
Wald Test (F) 12.396 [0.0000]** 1.2691 [0.2876] 2.4770 [0.0876] 
Observation 73 73 146 
Notes: Values in brackets for coefficients are the t values, D.W. represents the Durbin Watson 
statistics of the models and the values in brackets for Wald Test F statistics are respective F 
statistics to compare in order to test the Hypothesis H0: Φ
+= Φ- (** indicates that the 
hypothesis is rejected with 1% significance level and * indicates 5% significance level). 
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Thus, the results of the Wald Tests reveal that there exist asymmetries between retail diesel 
prices with tax and Brent crude oil prices for both sub periods and the period between 2007 
and 2009 whereas there exists asymmetry between retail diesel prices without tax and Brent 
crude oil prices only in sub period 1; for sub period 2 and for the whole sample there is 
symmetrical relationship between retail diesel prices and Brent crude oil prices. The results 
and reasons of these asymmetries will be discussed in detail in the conclusion part. 
In order to gain a deeper understanding of asymmetrical adjustment of prices, it is also 
possible to comment on the direction of asymmetries by comparing the magnitudes of the 
positive and negative error correction terms. In other words, in order data to support the 
common perception of slower adjustment of downstream prices to decreases in crude oil 
prices than to increases, the coefficient value of EC
+
t-1 should be greater EC
-
t-1, in absolute 
terms. 
It is revealed on Table 7.4 that absolute value of the coefficient value of EC
+
t-1 is greater than 
the absolute value of the coefficient value of EC
-
t-1 for sub period one in both estimations; 
estimation one using the retail diesel prices with tax (in TL/Liter) and estimation two using 
the Retail Diesel Prices Without Tax (in TL/Liter) as the representative of downstream 
prices).  
However, for the first estimation using diesel prices with tax, there is also proven asymmetry 
(with 5% significance level) in the second sub period as well as the whole period of 
estimation one with the coefficient value of EC
+
t-1 is being less than the coefficient value of 
EC
-
t-1 in absolute terms. This result indicates that decreases in crude oil prices were 
transmitted to the fuel prices with taxes faster than the increases in crude oil prices for 
respective periods.  On the other hand when we look at the t values of the coefficients 
individually, it is observed that the coefficients of EC
+
t-1 for the sub period 2 and the whole 
sample are not statistically as strongly significant as the other models with asymmetry. 
Additionally, the models with diesel prices with tax for the sub period 2 and the whole sample 
are revealing weak form asymmetry due to 5% significance level of asymmetry hypothesis 
rejection. 
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8. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the downstream petroleum market in Turkey in terms of 
pricing, market structure and efficiency. Market efficiency is highly dependent on pricing 
structure and asymmetric pricing transmission is a source of market inefficiency. 
In our empirical analysis, possible asymmetrical adjustments of final pump prices of fuel in 
Turkey to changes in crude oil prices have been investigated through an asymmetric error 
correction model. Weekly diesel prices had been chosen to be included in our analysis as 
representative of final pump price in Turkey due to the fact that diesel has the highest share of 
consumption among other petroleum products consumed in Turkey. On the other hand, Brent 
crude oil prices are being used as upstream prices and the respective price in US dollars per 
barrel is converted to Turkish liras per liter by using weekly exchange rate and relevant 
conversion rate from barrel to liter.  
In order to capture the effect of tax on possible asymmetric price adjustments arising in the 
Turkish downstream petroleum market, we estimated the asymmetric error correction model 
for both the diesel price with and without tax.  
 
Table 8.1: Results of asymmetry analysis. 
 First Period Second Period Whole Sample 
 Y=Brent crude oil prices 
X= Diesel prices without tax Asymmetry (**) Symmetry Symmetry 
X= Diesel prices with tax Asymmetry (**) Asymmetry (*) Asymmetry (*) 
Notes:  (*) indicates that the hypothesis for symmetry is rejected with 5% confidence level, 
(**) indicates that the hypothesis for symmetry is rejected with 1% confidence level. First 
period: January, 05, 2007 – June, 27, 2008, Second Period: July, 04, 2008 – December, 25, 
2009. 
 
The table 8.1 reveals the results of our empirical analysis. As we’ve discussed in previous 
chapters, our analysis is built on two sub periods as well as the whole period that is from 
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January 2007 to the end of December 2009. As we can observe from table 7.1, there is 
evidence for asymmetrical pricing behavior in the sub period 1 both in the estimations using 
diesel prices with and without tax. As expected, asymmetrical pricing behavior in the 1st sub-
period is in the form of slower adjustment of diesel pump prices to decreases in crude oil 
prices than the increases. This result is also supporting the decisions and reports of the 
regulatory mechanisms in Turkey for the same period. On the other hand, we observe weak 
asymmetrical pricing behavior in the second sub sample and the whole sample regarding the 
estimations with diesel prices with tax. Statistically, the proven asymmetry is in the weak 
form with low confidence levels indicating decreases in crude oil prices were transmitted to 
the fuel prices with taxes faster than the increases in crude oil prices for respective periods. 
The reason behind this unexpected result can be related to the price ceiling regulation in the 
second sub period. It is considered as a market intervention resulting in decreasing distributor 
and retailer margins, however increasing taxes for the respective period. Thus the resulting 
weak asymmetry in the models with taxes could be the result of this market intervention 
where the ceiling prices were set by the regulation authority.  
In our analysis, as we’ve discussed before, we used the Brent crude oil prices as 
representative of upstream prices. Then we converted the dollar per gallon prices into Turkish 
Lira per liter prices in order to eliminate the effect of exchange rate fluctuations on the crude 
oil prices. The conversion of gallon to liter has also allowed us to conduct our analysis on the 
same measurement levels. 
In order to explain the reasons behind the asymmetrical price adjustments in Turkish 
downstream petroleum markets, stakeholders must be defined to assess their contribution and 
influence on the existing asymmetry. Thus the stakeholders include the monopoly positioned 
refinery (TUPRAS), five biggest retailers holding around 80% market share of the 
downstream petroleum market, distributors operating the fuel stations, government levying 
special consumption and value added taxes on petroleum products and the Energy Market 
Regulatory Authority (EMRA). We will analyze the roles and the impacts of these 
stakeholders on existing price asymmetries and propose suggestions regarding what would 
force them to reduce or eliminate the existing asymmetric pricing behavior. 
As we’ve mentioned in previous chapters, TUPRAS has the monopoly position as the sole 
refinery operating in Turkey and had been privatized in January 2006. Before privatization, 
financial reports of TUPRAS were indicating negative operating profit supporting the fact that 
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the technology was old and the productivity rate was quite low compared to the other 
refineries in Europe. After privatization, there had been significant investment in order to 
improve the technology and productivity rates. On the other hand, it is observed from figure 
4.3 in chapter 4 that distributor margin and retailer margin contribute around 6% each to the 
final pump price compared to around 33% contribution of refinery pricing. Thus it is 
supported that as a monopoly compared to competitive (close to oligopoly) structure of 
retailers market, TUPRAS as a sole refinery has significant pricing power. If we revisit 
chapter 4, it is indicated that the refinery margins increased above the Mediterranean average 
margin level for the period 2007 and mid 2008. This might be due to the reason that the 
significant investment done by the private owner of TUPRAS was paying pack, increasing the 
productivity levels and decreasing the costs resulting in higher margins for the refinery. Thus, 
the roots of asymmetric pricing could highly be related to this transition period where the 
profits coming from increasing petroleum prices had been captured by the refinery. 
The market shares of five big players in the retail industry are also important to consider in 
terms of market power. As explained in chapter 4, retail and distributer prices of fuels in 
Turkey are significantly higher than the ones in UK and the US. This difference is highly 
related to the relatively higher operating costs of fuel stations in Turkey due to much more 
workers employed. To illustrate, unlike most of the other countries, fuel stations in Turkey 
employ pumpers and car washers adding extra costs on operating these stations. Thus the cost 
of additional labor force is limiting the affect of downward movements of crude oil prices, 
enabling less flexibility on price decreases. 
On the other hand, as also stated by the Competition Authority (Gunduz et al., 2008), retail 
companies set ceiling prices for petroleum products to the fuel stations. Fuel stations take this 
price as the final pump price allowing the retail companies to be price setters in the 
distribution segment too. Moreover, as stated by EMRA, the retail companies are obliged to 
share these ceiling prices to the public allowing the other players to get price information of 
their competitors. Thus this situation limits the price competition allowing five big retail 
companies (holding around 80% of the downstream market) to retain their pricing power; 
thusly creating an oligopolistic market.  
In terms of downstream profitability, Turkey outperforms all EU countries together with the 
relatively higher fuel prices in all segments. It is a fact that the taxes and exchange rates play a 
role in high fuel prices; however it does not change the fact that the downstream profitability 
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figures are much higher than the European average. This fact has been mentioned many times 
in the annual petroleum sector reports of EMRA and the players in the downstream market are 
warned about this price distorting situation. In the end, as argued fiercely by downstream 
players, EMRA banned the promotional activities of the distributors and retailers (offers of 
gifts etc.) and imposed a price ceiling in the summer of 2009 for two months. In modern 
economic theory, these non-market price interventions are not favored due to the fact that the 
prices in a competitive market are set by market forces. However, in this situation, EMRA 
decided that there exists an oligopolistic downstream market structure in Turkey and used its 
right to intervene with price ceiling. 
It is important to stress out the fact that in our analysis, we found asymmetry in the first sub 
period (January, 05, 2007 – June, 27, 2008) where the Competition Authority submitted its 
report regarding the distortions in the competition of downstream market. The report 
concluded that the retail prices are less sensitive to the downward movements of crude oil 
prices than upward movements. This report supports our empirical results of asymmetrical 
pricing behavior in the period from January, 05, 2007 to June, 27, 2008 both with our 
estimations through diesel prices with tax and without tax.  
As we’ve discussed before this asymmetry may arise from different factors and by law 
EMRA is the regulatory mechanism to fix this problem. Our analysis suggest that the 
resulting asymmetry might stem from retail pricing or refinery pricing since we exclude the 
exchange rate and taxes in our estimation through diesel prices without tax. What EMRA 
missing in its analysis is not considering the fact that although TUPRAS is pricing its 
products within the 3% mark-up allowed (by law) against the referenced CIF Mediterranean  
prices, the resulting asymmetrical pricing behavior in the downstream market is also related to 
the refinery pricing. This argument is highly supported by the significant pricing power of 
TUPRAS as a monopoly and well notable above Mediterranean average profit margins 
observed in 2007, 2008 and 2009. As stated in the petroleum law, the 3% mark-up advantage 
gives the refinery the right to increase its prices up to 3% of referenced CIF Mediterranean 
price increases and on the other hand when the referenced CIF Mediterranean prices decreases 
the law allows the refinery to reflect this price decrease less than 3%. The aforementioned 
situation certainly allows the refinery to engage in asymmetric pricing behavior which is 
supported by law. 
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In order to overcome with this issue, the strong monopoly position of TUPRAS should be 
discouraged via enabling other players to enter the market. It is also significantly important to 
increase the number and the size of storage facilities in order the imported petroleum products 
to compete better with TUPRAS’s products in terms of costs of storage. This will force 
TUPRAS to lower its product prices. 
It is also noteworthy, as stated in the report of the Competition Authority, that the retail and 
distribution margins are much above the European average allowing downstream players to 
gain excessive return. It can be observed that the retailers react faster than the refinery to 
increases in crude oil prices by raising the prices of their petroleum products. In other words, 
when the crude oil prices increase, the pump prices of fuels are being raised before TUPRAS 
increases it petroleum product prices. However the reverse situation (the decreases in crude 
oil prices) is not reflected as fast as the increases in the upstream prices. Moreover, the 
Competition Authority implied in its fuel sector report that there exists an oligopolistic market 
structure distorting competition in the downstream petroleum sector; supported by EMRA’s 
decision on banning promotion activities of fuel stations and imposing price interventions 
(price ceiling). All these arguments support the fact that the resulting asymmetrical pricing 
behavior in our empirical studies is also related to the lack of competition in retail market 
allowing the players to gain significantly higher profits compared to other countries. 
Compared to the monopoly position of the refinery in the sector, there are around 40 active 
players in the retail market; however the five biggest players in the sector share around 80% 
percent of the market. As we’ve stated before, in order to increase the competition in the 
market and allow small sized players to gain further market share, EMRA passed a regulation 
to lower the duration of the contracts with distributors. This will enable more competition in 
the market. 
On the other hand, EMRA’s intervention in order to prevent oligopolistic structure in the 
retail sector resulted in lower distributor and retailer margins. One can say that the regulation 
was effective, however when we look at the bigger picture, it is observed that the resulting 
decrease in retail and distributor margins is captured by the government via increased taxes 
(special consumption tax). Thus the tax burden on fuel products increased further, resulting 
consumers to still pay the highest fuel price in Europe. 
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Thus it is suggested in our empirical analysis; the resulting asymmetry is also related to the 
pricing strategies and existing oligopolistic market structure in the retail sector.  The role of 
EMRA is highly significant in this situation to overcome this market imperfection. Instead of 
implying short term solutions as price ceilings (for 2 months), EMRA needs to encourage 
structural changes in the sector. Shortening the duration of contracts with distributors is an 
example of these structural changes. Furthermore, the retailers impose ceiling prices to its 
distributors and as expected these ceiling prices are becoming the actual prices for these 
contracted fuel stations. This situation creates similar prices for the distributors in the same 
regions blocking the possible price competition and disabling lower prices. It is highly 
important for EMRA to further change these rules to favor competition in the market and 
enable structural change in the long term towards a competitive market. 
On the other hand as recommended in the IEA report (2009), a light handed regulation should 
be implemented in order to ensure competition and sufficient investment as a response to 
increasing demand of refining, transportation and storage capacity. This is possible in the 
Turkish downstream petroleum sector via creating a separate regulatory mechanism only 
responsible with the downstream part of the sector. Energy Market Regulatory Authority is 
responsible for all Energy markets and the department that is responsible for petroleum 
industry is responsible for both downstream and upstream sector. 
In order for the regulatory mechanism to implement better policies to secure competition in 
the downstream market, a continuous inspection and control should be followed in the sector. 
Thus a single Downstream Petroleum Market Regulation Authority could perform more 
efficiently to realize this goal letting the market to operate in a better structured way.  
It is also highly important to stress out the effect of taxation on high fuel prices in Turkey and 
its effect on pricing behavior in the sector. As we’ve explained before, taxation on petroleum 
products in Turkey is considered to be the highest in Europe and around 60% of the pump 
price of diesel is consisted of taxes. In this perspective, government has a strong tool in its 
hand as an excise tax called special consumption tax in terms of its effect on final prices 
petroleum products. Unlike value added tax, special consumption tax is an excise tax open to 
changes at anytime and had been increased frequently since it was first introduced in 2002. 
Thus taxation through changes in special consumption tax may contribute to the asymmetrical 
pricing behavior, when asymmetric error correction models include fuel price with tax. 
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When we consider the share of tax revenues stemming from petroleum products taxation on 
total tax revenues of Turkish government, a decrease in the special consumption tax is not 
expected in the short term. Thus the effect of taxation on fuel pricing is mostly further 
increases in fuel prices when the crude oil prices increase or stay stable and if the amount of 
special consumption tax increases when the crude oil prices decreases then the overall effect 
is more ambiguous. In other word, taxation could cause stickiness of fuel prices to the 
downward movements of crude oil prices or could cause the opposite effect with further 
increases in crude oil prices during crude oil price increases. 
Besides picturing the current market structure in Turkish downstream petroleum market, the 
contribution of this thesis to the current literature is the empirical proof of asymmetrical 
pricing behavior in the downstream sector as also suggested in the fuel sector report of the 
Competition Authority. Thus our analysis supports the results of this report empirically via 
applying econometrical methods such as cointegration methods and asymmetric error 
correction models; providing thorough analysis of the various factors behind possible 
asymmetries and reaching a competitive and efficient downstream market in terms of 
structure and stability. The previous studies on the efficiency of the Turkish downstream 
petroleum market are limited and rather outdated. Furthermore, they don’t specifically 
contribute to the discussion of fuel sector report results of the Competition Authority and the 
criticism regarding the activities of regulatory mechanisms in the period from 2007 to the end 
of 2009.   
Further research can be conducted in this manner to analyze determinants of existing 
asymmetrical pricing behavior in the market. It is also the Competition Authority’s 
responsibility to analyze the pricing behavior of the monopoly positioned refinery in order to 
conclude whether the current mark-up advantage of the refinery is being abused via practicing 
sticky prices to the downward movements of crude oil prices. 
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10. APPENDIX 
Table 10.1: Crude oil production in OECD countries from 2002 to 2008, in million tons. 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Australia 31,3 29,1 26,2 22,9 21,9 24 22,2 
Austria 1 1 1,1 1 1 1 1 
Canada 132,9 140,4 145,4 143,5 151,3 156,8 154,6 
Czech Republic 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,6 0,4 0,4 0,4 
Denmark 18,1 18,1 19,3 18,5 16,8 15,2 14 
Finland 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,2 0,1 0,1 
France 1,5 1,6 1,6 1,4 1,1 1,1 1,1 
Germany 4,6 4,8 4,9 5,2 5,2 5,2 4,9 
Greece 0,2 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 
Hungary 1,6 1,6 1,6 1,4 1,3 1,2 1,2 
Italy 5,8 5,9 5,7 6,4 6,3 6,6 6,3 
Japan 0,6 0,6 0,7 0,7 0,7 0,7 0,7 
Korea 0,5 0,5 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,6 0,5 
Mexico 178,3 189,3 191,4 187,6 183,2 175,4 159,5 
Netherlands 3,1 3,1 2,9 2,3 2 3 2,5 
New Zealand 1,6 1,2 1,1 1 1 2 2,8 
Norway 157,7 153,6 143,9 132,8 123,6 119,4 107,2 
Poland 0,8 0,8 0,9 0,9 0,8 0,7 0,8 
Slovak Republic 0,1 .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Spain 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,2 0,1 0,1 0,1 
Turkey 2,4 2,4 2,3 2,3 2,2 2,1 2,2 
United Kingdom 116,1 106,2 95,5 84,7 76,6 76,8 72,2 
United States 348,1 338,4 325,9 310 304,4 304 300,5 
EU27 total 161,5 151,7 140,7 129 118 116,8 .. 
OECD total 1007,1 999,8 971,9 924,1 900,8 896,7 854,9 
Brazil 75,6 77,9 77,6 85,7 90,8 92,4 .. 
Chile 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,3 0,3 0,5 .. 
China 167,1 169,7 175,9 181,4 184,9 186,4 .. 
India 37,4 37,7 38,3 36,3 38,1 38,2 .. 
Indonesia 62,8 59,4 54,9 51,4 48,2 45,3 .. 
Israel 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Russian Federation 377,2 418,6 456,3 466,4 475,8 487,7 .. 
South Africa 1 0,7 1,7 1,7 1,5 1,2 .. 
World 3599,2 3723,4 3857,7 3914,3 3926 3915,4 .. 
Source: OECD statistics database, (2009) 
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Table 10.2: Jarque-Bera normality test results for the variables diesel prices with and 
without tax and crude oil prices. 
 
Normality test:   Chi^2(2) 
Prices/Period Sub 1 Sub 2 Whole Period 
Diesel (tax included) 43.136 [0.0000]** 9.4196 [0.0090]** 39.279 [0.0000]** 
Diesel (without tax) 53.131 [0.0000]** 44.250 [0.0000]** 107.75 [0.0000]** 
Crude oil (TL/Liter) 33.832 [0.0000]** 4.7242 [0.0942] 20.272 [0.0000]** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
